IRF IRAN WORKING GROUP

Freedom of Religion or Belief in Iran's Democratic Future

Findings and Recommendations from the IRF Iran Working Group

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June 2026

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Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the IRF Iran Working Group, a curated expert dialogue on Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) convened by Living Water Productions between February and May 2026. The initiative brought together Iranian scholars, legal thinkers, civil society practitioners, religious-minority voices, and human rights advocates — from inside Iran and across the diaspora — to examine what religious freedom would mean in a democratic Iran, and how it can be secured as a foundation of any future political order.

Across six thematic sessions and a concluding session on diplomacy, the conversation moved from foundational concepts in international law toward the lived realities of religious repression in Iran. The group worked on a secure virtual platform in Farsi and English, supported by a structured Farsi-language curriculum on FoRB. Because state-imposed internet blackouts repeatedly prevented participants inside Iran from joining, the sessions became more intimate than planned and the diaspora perspective predominated — a context that shaped, and must be read alongside, every finding in this report.

The most significant and consistent insight to emerge was psychological rather than legal. Four decades of the Islamic Republic weaponizing religion as an instrument of state control have left many Iranians with a deep, internalized fear not only of the regime but of organized faith itself. For people whose entire experience of religion has been coercive, the very idea of "religious freedom" can feel paradoxical or threatening. This finding — underrepresented in international FoRB discourse — has direct consequences for how any credible strategy for Iran must be framed: around the protection of individual conscience, including the right to change or leave belief, rather than the protection of religious institutions.

Alongside this central insight, participants reached broad consensus on the foundational principles that must underpin a post-theocratic Iran: the complete separation of religion from state, the protection of conscience as an individual and non-derogable right, neutrality in public education, equal citizenship regardless of belief, and the recovery of Iran's own pluralist heritage as a culturally legitimate basis for FoRB. The group also identified the structural mechanics of discrimination — from religious declaration on employment forms to faith-based gatekeeping in hiring — that reproduce inequality beneath the level of formal law.

The Working Group was, by design, a foundational dialogue rather than a drafting body. Its enduring contribution is a body of authentic testimony, a clarified set of consensus principles, and a clear-eyed assessment, grounded in Iranian experience, of what any credible approach to religious freedom in Iran must hold. The concluding section draws those threads together.

Erica Saghar Kasraie
Founder & Executive Director, Living Water Productions · Project Director and Facilitator, IRF Iran Working Group

Background and Objectives

Freedom of Religion or Belief remains one of the defining human rights failures of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For more than four decades, the state has constructed a tiered system of citizenship in which recognized minorities are constrained, unrecognized communities such as the Baha'is are denied legal existence, and those who leave Islam face severe penalty. Religious classification governs access to education, employment, and public life. There is no lawful mechanism to exit the state religion. Iran has been designated a Country of Particular Concern by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for more than two decades.

Yet within Iran's democratic movement, religious freedom is rarely treated as a developed, shared agenda. It is often deferred behind questions of security, economy, or governance, or avoided as too sensitive. The IRF Iran Working Group was convened to address that gap — not by importing an external framework, but by creating a safe, Farsi-capable space in which Iranians could examine FoRB on their own terms, drawing on their own history, references, and lived experience.

The Working Group was convened and led by Living Water Productions. Its purpose was threefold:

1. First, to build a shared understanding of FoRB as a matter of international human rights law and of Iranian aspiration — establishing common vocabulary and concepts across a group with deep lived experience but limited prior exposure to FoRB as a formal framework.
2. Second, to surface and document how religious repression is actually experienced in Iran — not as abstraction, but as daily psychological, civic, and economic reality — and to identify the principles a free Iran would need to protect.
3. Third, to assess what the democratic movement still requires to translate these convictions into a credible, diplomat-facing approach over time.

This report presents the insights drawn from that process and translates them into findings and recommendations for the democratic movement, international partners, civil society, and faith communities engaged on Iran.

Methodology

This report is grounded in a structured dialogue process conducted between February and May 2026. The methodology prioritized participatory engagement, security, and evidence drawn directly from lived experience rather than abstract theory.

Dialogue Process

The Working Group convened six thematic sessions on a secure virtual platform, supplemented by a concluding session on diplomacy with a guest speaker. Several sessions were extended into two meetings because the material was new to participants and the discussion warranted additional time. Sessions were facilitated by Erica Kasraie, with Zagros serving as co-facilitator, and were conducted in Farsi and English to remove linguistic barriers. A structured Farsi-language curriculum — the eight-part

FoRB Learning Platform film series and the Live What You Believe short-film series, with Farsi transcripts — was circulated and discussed throughout.

Participants

Twenty-three Iranian and international participants took part across the series. The group was composed primarily of Iranian diaspora members living in Europe, with a cohort inside Iran whose participation was repeatedly disrupted by state-imposed internet blackouts. Participants brought a range of backgrounds:

- Scholars and researchers in philosophy, political geography, and Middle East studies
- Legal and constitutional thinkers
- Civil society practitioners and political activists
- Religious-minority and secular voices, reflecting Christian, Jewish, and non-religious backgrounds
- Human rights advocates and media practitioners
- Diaspora and international FoRB experts and a guest U.S. diplomat

Composition by location. Participants joined from Iran, Germany, Cyprus, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, giving the dialogue both an inside-Iran and a transnational diaspora dimension.

Dimension	Profile of the Group
Format	Six thematic sessions + a concluding diplomacy session; secure virtual platform
Period	February – May 2026
Languages	Farsi and English
Faith backgrounds	Christian, Jewish, and non-religious / secular
Locations represented	Iran, Germany, Cyprus, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, United States
Curriculum	8-part FoRB Learning Platform film series and Live What You Believe series, with Farsi transcripts

A Note on Group Size

Because of the ongoing internet blackout inside Iran, sessions were smaller and more intimate than originally planned, and the absence of inside-Iran participants meant the diaspora perspective dominated the discussion. This is a meaningful interpretive caveat: the voices most directly subject to Iran's religious repression — those still living within it — were the voices most often silenced in these sessions. The findings should be read with that limitation in view.

Data and Thematic Analysis

Sessions were facilitated, documented, and analyzed to extract shared themes. Despite the diversity of participants, several patterns recurred consistently across the series:

- The weaponization of religion and a resulting fear of faith itself

- The absence of any lawful mechanism to change or leave one's religion
- Structural and institutional discrimination operating beneath formal law
- A strong consensus for the separation of religion from state
- The need to distinguish political Islamism from personal faith
- Protection of children's future freedom of conscience
- Iran's own pluralist heritage as a culturally legitimate basis for FoRB

These themes form the analytical foundation of the findings that follow.

Ethical and Protective Measures

Given the acute risks faced by participants inside Iran, this report does not identify individual speakers by full name. Participants inside Iran took part under pseudonyms or first names only, and their identities are known solely to the project director. Contributions are presented thematically rather than attributed in a way that could place any individual or community at legal, social, or personal risk. For the same reason, the comprehensive report is intended for limited circulation among direct funders and trusted partners rather than broad distribution.

Why This Method Is Effective

Because religion has been so thoroughly politicized in Iran, conventional surveys or open forums cannot capture how FoRB is actually experienced. A secure, Farsi-capable dialogue allowed participants to speak candidly about repression, exile, conversion, and the possibility of reform. The result is a body of knowledge rooted in Iranian reality rather than imposed from an external framework — precisely the kind of grounding that a credible strategy for a future Iran requires.

Key Findings

The dialogues revealed that the denial of FoRB in Iran is not a set of isolated violations but a system sustained through law, institutional culture, political ideology, and — most distinctively — a deep psychological residue left by decades of state-weaponized religion. Seven findings capture the most significant patterns identified across the series.

4.1 The Weaponization of Religion and a Deep-Seated Fear of Faith Itself

The single most striking and consistent theme across all sessions was the profound psychological impact of the Islamic Republic's use of Islam as an instrument of state terror. Participants — especially those who lived inside Iran before going into exile — described an internalized fear not only of the regime but of organized religion itself. The state has so thoroughly fused religious identity with surveillance, repression, and violence that many Iranians associate any organized faith with control and threat. This creates a unique challenge for FoRB work in Iran: the very concept of religious freedom can feel paradoxical, even dangerous, to people whose entire experience of religion has been coercive.

4.2 The Absence of an Exit Mechanism

Beginning with a hypothetical scenario in the opening session — a country where citizens voluntarily adopt a single faith — the group identified the decisive question for any religious order: whether individuals retain a real, lawful mechanism to change or leave their belief. In Iran no such mechanism exists; apostasy carries the gravest penalties. Participants concluded that even a popularly endorsed religious arrangement becomes a form of tyranny when the means of revising it are blocked, and that a future Iranian constitution must guarantee both the right to leave belief and an explicit mechanism for revising the role of religion in public life.

4.3 Structural and Institutional Discrimination Beyond the Law

Discrimination in Iran operates not only through statute but through institutional culture. Employment forms requiring religious declaration, university hiring that prizes Islamic proficiency over merit, and professional structures organized around religious conformity together create a system in which faith-based gatekeeping replaces competence. Participants noted, by contrast, the significance of the rare Iranian bank whose account-opening form omits any religion field — welcomed by Baha'is, Yarsanis, and others routinely excluded by religious classification — as a small illustration of how the removal of religious declaration immediately restores dignity and access.

4.4 Reframing FoRB Around Individual Conscience, Not Institutions

One of the most clarifying shifts across the series was the recognition that FoRB protects people, not religions. Drawing on the FoRB curriculum and a close reading of Article 18, the group distinguished the absolute inner freedom to hold, change, or abandon belief from the outer freedom to manifest belief, which may be lawfully limited. For a group instinctively wary of protecting religious institutions, framing FoRB as the protection of individual conscience — including the right to hold no belief at all — proved far more resonant than framing centered on safeguarding religious communities as such.

4.5 Distinguishing Political Islamism from Personal Faith

Participants engaged directly with the relationship between Islam as personal faith and Islamism as a governing ideology. In the Iranian experience the two have been so fused that many in the group, drawing on lived experience, questioned whether such measured distinctions are even adequate to what they have endured. At the same time, the group recognized — and the strategic framing of this initiative affirms — that effective international advocacy must separate critique of a political ideology from critique of a faith tradition. Reconciling the group's hard-won conviction with that diplomatic necessity is among the central communications challenges for any future advocacy: how to convey Iran's critical experience of state religion at the policy level without generating diplomatic backlash or being misread as hostility toward Muslims.

4.6 Children's Future Freedom of Conscience

The group devoted significant attention to religious education and the rights of children. Participants debated models of state neutrality — including the German approach in which religious instruction is optional and age-bounded — and argued for replacing compulsory religious instruction with neutral, age-appropriate education that introduces religion as history and culture rather than practice. The shared concern was the protection of children's future freedom of conscience: ensuring that young people are not shaped by coerced religious instruction before they can form independent convictions.

4.7 Reclaiming FoRB as Iranian Heritage, Not Western Imposition

A recurring strategic insight was that FoRB need not be framed as a foreign value. Participants pointed to Iran's pre-Islamic inheritance — Zoroastrian principles of free will and the Cyrus Cylinder's ancient tradition of tolerance — as a culturally legitimate and domestically resonant foundation for religious freedom. Grounding FoRB in Iran's own civilization, rather than in imported language, counters the regime's narrative that religious freedom is a Western imposition and gives the principle both internal credibility and international weight.

Summary of Findings

Taken together, the findings show that the denial of FoRB in Iran is structural and self-reinforcing — but also that the conceptual foundations for a free, pluralistic Iran already exist within the group's own analysis and within Iran's own heritage. Where religion is weaponized, fear corrodes civic trust; where conscience is protected as an individual right, the basis for equal citizenship returns. The distinctive contribution of this Working Group is to have named the psychological dimension of that problem and to have articulated, from an Iranian vantage point, the principles that any credible solution must hold.

Session Summaries

The following summaries trace the arc of the dialogue across the session series, from foundational concepts through the concluding session on diplomacy. They draw on session notes and the group's working documentation.

Session 1 — Foundations of Freedom

February 17, 2026 · Opening session with Shirin Taber, Empower Women Media

The opening session used a hypothetical scenario — a country in which all citizens voluntarily adopt one religion — to test the structural conditions for genuine religious freedom. The group quickly turned to Iran as a case study of a system with no meaningful exit. Participants distinguished domestic sovereignty from international consequence, observing that even a popularly endorsed religious state becomes totalitarian when the mechanism for reversing collective decisions is blocked. Three conceptual anchors emerged that shaped the rest of the series: respect for the human being is not the same as respect for a belief; religion belongs in the private sphere while criticism of religion must remain legally protected; and a future constitution must include explicit mechanisms for revising the role of religion in public life.

Session 2 — Article 18 and the Architecture of FoRB

Spring 2026 (extended across two meetings)

This session provided a close reading of Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR, examining the fundamental distinction between the freedom to hold a belief — absolute and unrestricted — and the freedom to act on it, which is subject to lawful limitation. The group confronted the absence of a universal legal definition of "religion" and worked through case studies on conscience in professional contexts, including the tension between personal belief and anti-discrimination principles, and the principle that in critical professions such as medicine personal belief cannot justify the refusal of essential care. The group reached consensus that a future Iran must protect religious criticism as free speech, hold religion to the private sphere, and rely on general constitutional principles rather than legislating every conflict case by case.

Session 3 — Islam, Islamism, and the Right to Change Belief

April 6, 2026

Among the most substantive and emotionally resonant sessions, this discussion separated Islam as personal faith from Islamism as political ideology. Participants drew on lived experience to describe how, in Iran, political Islam has fused so completely with state repression that many citizens experience any organized religion as threatening. The group examined conversion among Iranians in the diaspora — particularly to Christianity — and the contrast between social tolerance for it in Western host societies and the hostility encountered elsewhere. It treated apostasy and blasphemy structures as objects of political analysis rather than theological debate, and identified the central communications challenge of presenting Iran's critical experience of Islam at the international level without generating diplomatic backlash.

Session 4 — Manifestation, Public Practice, and Religious Education

April 13, 2026

Session 4 turned to the outer dimension of FoRB — the right to manifest and practice belief, and its lawful limits. The group debated what restrictions a future democratic Iran might justifiably place on public religious expression given the population's collective trauma, weighing analogies from other contexts. Religious education was a major focus: participants argued against compulsory religious instruction and for age-appropriate, neutral introduction of religion as a subject of history and culture, with the protection of children's future freedom of conscience as the guiding principle.

Session 5 — Protection from Coercion and Discrimination

April 20, 2026

This session examined how coercion and discrimination operate systemically — not only through explicit law but through institutional culture. The group explored how religious declaration on employment forms, faith-based hiring, and professional structures organized around religious conformity create structural inequality and reward conformity over merit. Participants offered critical readings of several curriculum films, arguing that some engaged insufficiently with the Iranian experience of state-weaponized Islam, and discussed the precise boundaries of protected belief — including the argument that belief systems permitting harm to children should not receive equal legal protection. The session closed on children's rights and the tension between parental religious authority and a child's developing autonomy.

Session 6 — FoRB in Peacebuilding, Economic Renewal, and Social Trust

Spring 2026 (extended across two meetings) · Guest speaker: Saeed Ghasseminejad, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

The final thematic session connected FoRB to the broader project of national renewal, examining how religious freedom underpins social trust, economic participation, and stability. Participants linked the exclusion of religious minorities to brain drain, the erosion of institutions, and the weakening of civil society, and considered how a rights-based settlement could rebuild the trust on which a functioning society depends.

Concluding Session — Building the Diplomatic Roadmap

May 29, 2026 · Guest speaker: Daniel Holtrop, former U.S. Department of State diplomat

The concluding session brought in Daniel Holtrop, a former U.S. Department of State diplomat with deep experience in international religious freedom, to translate the group's foundational work into a practical understanding of diplomacy and advocacy. With roughly a third of the time devoted to presentation and the remainder to discussion and Q&A, the session demystified FoRB as a domain of U.S. foreign policy — the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, the State Department's dedicated office, and USCIRF, whose combined apparatus exceeds that of the rest of the world — and drew the essential distinction between the two channels of advocacy that both matter: official diplomatic engagement, and public opinion shaped through media, civil society, and diaspora networks. Drawing on his own experience with the international religious freedom caucus on Capitol Hill and in assisting refugees and survivors, the speaker illustrated how reports, coalitions, and briefings genuinely move policy, and situated Iran within the broader landscape of global FoRB challenges. A substantial portion explored the

religious roots of American civic culture — the First Amendment, the religious motivations of early settlers and immigrants, contemporary trends from the Pew Religious Landscape Study, and several Western models of the relationship between religion and culture — as one illustration of how religious conviction and democratic pluralism can reinforce rather than threaten one another, alongside the theme of citizen responsibility for sustaining a free society.

The discussion that followed concentrated on how FoRB might work in a future democratic Iran. Participants pointed to large-scale opinion research suggesting that, after decades of theocratic rule, Iran may no longer be a majority-religious society, as many Iranians have grown deeply disaffected from state-imposed faith. They identified Cyrus the Great's establishment of religious freedom as the authentic legacy of Persia in this sphere — in contrast to the later imposition of religious rule — and argued forcefully that a future Iran must be fully secular, with no coercive religious authority over public life; the compulsory hijab was cited as a clear example of the denial of women's freedom. Reflecting their lived experience of state-weaponized religion, participants voiced a strongly adversarial view of the regime's political-religious ideology and questioned whether measured distinctions such as "political Islam" or "Islamism" adequately capture what they have endured — a sentiment that underscores, rather than diminishes, the strategic communications challenge identified earlier in this report. The conversation also engaged the "tolerance dilemma" familiar to open societies, the appeasement of religiously motivated violence in parts of Europe, and the resilience democratic republics must continually renew.

The facilitator's assessment was that this is an unusually capable and influential group — distinguished by their scholarship, languages, and cross-national experience — already positioned to lead others on these questions. Their focus was understandably concentrated on Islam and Iran, sharpened by the massacres and regional crises of recent months, and they were visibly eager to move from theory toward practice. Over the course of the session the group also came to recognize more fully that other religious traditions can be peaceful and can themselves advance religious freedom, in contrast to coercive practices that suppress it.

The FoRB Learning Platform Curriculum

A structured Farsi-language curriculum anchored the series. All eight films of the FoRB Learning Platform were viewed and discussed, with Farsi transcripts available to participants, progressing from foundational definitions through the right to change belief, the right to manifest belief, protection from coercion and discrimination, the rights of parents and children, conscientious objection, and the lawful limitations on FoRB. The curriculum gave the group a shared conceptual vocabulary and, equally valuably, a set of materials that participants engaged critically from the Iranian vantage point.

Analysis and Lessons Learned

Several cross-cutting lessons emerged from the dialogue process — lessons that bear directly on how the democratic movement, its partners, and the international community should approach religious freedom in Iran.

Lesson 1 — Trauma Must Be Addressed Before Strategy

Participants came to the work with deep lived experience of persecution but limited prior exposure to FoRB as a formal framework. Sessions designed for strategy often served a foundational, almost therapeutic function instead. The lesson is that in societies where religion has been weaponized, trauma-informed, foundational FoRB education must precede policy advocacy; skipping that step produces analysis that does not hold.

Lesson 2 — Frame FoRB Around Conscience, Not Institutions

Resistance fell away when FoRB was framed as the protection of individual conscience — including the right to leave religion — rather than the protection of religious institutions. For an Iranian audience shaped by state religion, this framing is not a stylistic choice but the difference between a concept that resonates and one that repels.

Lesson 3 — Secularism Requires Constitutional Guarantees and a Revision Mechanism

The group's strongest consensus was for the complete separation of religion from state. But participants stressed that separation must be entrenched constitutionally and paired with explicit mechanisms for revising the role of religion in public life — so that a future settlement cannot quietly reproduce the very fusion of mosque and state it was meant to end.

Lesson 4 — Distinguish Political Islamism from Personal Faith

Effective advocacy depends on separating critique of a governing ideology from critique of a faith. This distinction protects coalitions, avoids diplomatic backlash, and keeps the focus where it belongs — on the state's coercion rather than on Islam itself.

Lesson 5 — Anchor FoRB in Iranian Heritage

Iran's own history — Zoroastrian free will, the Cyrus Cylinder, centuries of pluralist exchange — supplies a culturally legitimate foundation for FoRB. Reclaiming this heritage rather than importing external language is both a domestic mobilization tool and an international credibility asset.

Lesson 6 — The Diaspora Is an Asset; Inside-Iran Voices Must Be Protected and Included

The diaspora brought analytical depth and exposure to democratic governance, and can be professionalized into a coordinated advocacy network. But the repeated silencing of inside-Iran participants by internet blackouts is a structural weakness. Future work must build secure, resilient channels so that those living the reality are not absent from the strategy built in their name.

Lesson 7 — Testimony Must Be Translated into Diplomatic Strategy

The concluding session made clear that authentic testimony and consensus principles, however valuable, are not yet a diplomatic strategy. Moving from lived experience to a credible, diplomat-facing policy

product requires constitutional, legal, and diplomatic expertise — a recognition of the distinct work that any serious follow-on effort would demand.

Recommendations

The findings translate into practical recommendations for the principal actors who will shape religious freedom in Iran's future. They are organized by audience.

For a Future Democratic Iran (Constitutional and Legal)

1. Separate religion from state completely — removing religious classification from public institutions, guaranteeing equal citizenship regardless of belief, and entrenching this separation constitutionally.
2. Protect freedom of conscience as an absolute, non-derogable individual right — including the right to hold, change, or abandon belief and to hold no belief at all, never contingent on community or institutional belonging.
3. End religious declaration and faith-based gatekeeping in employment, education, and public services, so that competence rather than conformity governs civic and professional life.
4. Reform public education — replacing compulsory religious instruction with neutral civic education that protects children's future freedom of conscience.
5. Build in a revision mechanism so that the role of religion in public life can be lawfully reconsidered, preventing any future re-fusion of religion and state.

For Iran's Democratic Movement and Leadership

1. Adopt FoRB as a foundational pillar of the democratic platform — not a secondary human rights concern, but a cornerstone of legitimacy and equal citizenship.
2. Root the FoRB message in Iranian heritage, drawing on the Cyrus Cylinder and Iran's pluralist past to present religious freedom as an Iranian value rather than a foreign demand.
3. Frame the agenda around individual conscience, ensuring the movement's language protects belief and non-belief alike.

For International Partners, Policymakers, and Diplomats

1. Engage the full architecture of international religious freedom — the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for IRF, the State Department's IRF office, USCIRF, and comparable bodies in allied governments and at the UN and EU.
2. Pursue both channels of advocacy — diplomatic engagement with governments and public engagement through media, civil society, and diaspora networks.
3. Avoid the perception of Western imposition by working through Iranian voices and grounding FoRB in Iran's own traditions.
4. Protect at-risk activists and inside-Iran participants through diplomatic advocacy, rapid-response support, and secure channels.

For Civil Society and the Diaspora

1. Professionalize and coordinate diaspora advocacy into a durable, credentialed network able to brief decision-makers and contribute to policy.
2. Build secure, resilient platforms that keep inside-Iran voices present despite internet blackouts and surveillance.
3. Invest before the transition window opens — building frameworks, networks, and FoRB literacy in advance, because transitions are narrow and fragile.

For Faith Communities, Media, and Education

1. Distinguish political Islamism from personal faith in all public messaging, to build coalitions without diplomatic backlash.
2. Use media to model pluralism — amplifying examples of coexistence and countering the narrative that FoRB threatens faith.
3. Develop FoRB-literate curricula and materials in Farsi that present religious freedom as protection for believers and non-believers alike.

Conclusion

The IRF Iran Working Group set out to examine what religious freedom would mean in a democratic Iran. What it produced was different in kind from a finished policy paper — and, in its own way, more foundational. The series generated a rare body of authentic testimony, a clarified set of consensus principles, and a distinctive insight, underrepresented in international FoRB discourse, into the psychological legacy of state-weaponized religion. It also surfaced, honestly, the limits of what a foundational dialogue could produce: the diplomatic, legal, and constitutional translation of these convictions will require sustained work and expertise beyond the scope of the group as constituted.

This should not be read as a shortfall but as a clarification of where the value of this process lies. The enduring contribution of the Working Group is the testimony, the core psychological finding, and the consensus principles documented in this report — a clear-eyed account, grounded in Iranian experience, of what any credible approach to religious freedom in Iran must hold.

The Working Group's deepest conclusion is also its simplest. Where religion is weaponized, fear corrodes the trust on which any society depends; where conscience is protected as an individual right, the foundation for equal citizenship returns. Securing freedom of religion or belief is therefore not a peripheral concern for Iran's future — it is a prerequisite for a free, pluralistic, and durable one.

Project Team

1. **Erica Saghar Kasraie** — Project Director and Facilitator; Founder & Executive Director, Living Water Productions
2. **Zagros** — Co-Facilitator; human rights activist, writer, and producer
3. **Daniel Holtrop** — Guest Speaker, concluding session on diplomacy; former U.S. Department of State diplomat

Acknowledgment

This dialogue process was made possible through the support of Empower Women Media, whose seed funding helped convene the IRF Iran Working Group and whose commitment to women's leadership, religious freedom, and peacebuilding helped bring Iranian and diaspora voices into this conversation. We extend our sincere appreciation for that partnership and for a shared commitment to advancing dignity, conscience, and equal citizenship for the people of Iran.

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